Political Culture Versus Socioeconomic Approaches to Predicting Police Strength in U.S. Police Agencies
research has examined the effect of local political culture on police organizational behavior such as policing style (Zhao & Hassell, 2005) , organizational structures adopted (Hassell, Zhao, & Maguire, 2003) , and municipal crime rates (Stucky, 2003) .
We use the term local political culture approach to represent the view that police organizational behavior is explained by the local political culture through municipal government structures (e.g., Stucky, 2005 ; J. Q. Wilson, 1968) . Developed from the discipline of political science in the first half of the 20th century (Banfield & Wilson, 1963; Graham, 1967; Hofstadter, 1955) , this perspective proposes that the influence of unique political culture, as manifested in local government structure, on police organizations is either highly stable or invariant (e.g., Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Morgan, 1980; J. Q. Wilson, 1968) . It has been argued that particular types of government structures correspond to styles of policing (J. Q. Wilson, 1968) and fixed levels of police strength (Stucky, 2005) .
In contrast, what we term the socioeconomic approach posits that important aspects of police organizational behavior are primarily contingent on the nature of the external environment within which the agencies operate. This approach argues that the socioeconomic characteristics of a community largely determine the number of police officers and the strategic priorities set by a local police agency. Several scholars of American policing have found that police strength is heavily influenced by local crime rates and minority populations (Borcherding & Deacon, 1972; Huff & Stahura, 1980; Levitt, 1997; Marvell & Moody, 1996; Nalla, 1992; Sever, 2001) . Viewed from this perspective, the variation in community characteristics determines, to a large degree, police strength and policing style in a local community. The socioeconomic approach has played a rather prominent role in policing research since 1970s, but the local political culture approach has been revisited in recent research (Stucky, 2003 (Stucky, , 2005 Zhao & Hassell, 2005; Zhao, He, & Lovrich, 2006) .
The purpose of this study is to examine the relative utility of two competing approaches in explaining variation in police strength. A longitudinal data set of 280 cities surveyed in 1993, 1996, 2000, and 2003 is used in the analysis. These surveys were conducted at a time in which police officers were being hired in greater numbers across the country. A two-way fixedeffects statistical model using panel data is applied to control for geographic differences and the effects of unobserved variables.
Literature Review The Local Political Culture Approach
Local politics in the United States, particularly during the second half of the 19th century, was clearly a reflection of "grass-roots democracy" (Hofstadter, 1955) . The key civic concept of this type of democracy is the maximization of the representation of people and the assurance of open access to locally elected decision makers (Lineberry & Fowler, 1967) . Accordingly, the traditional American local government structure at the city level reflects the historical tradition of "grassroots" representation with the following characteristics: (a) mayor-council governmental structure, (b) representatives elected by wards to maximize the representation of the local interests (Lineberry, 1978) , and (c) partisan elections. Kessel (1962) observed that this traditional grassroots government structure is usually found in cities of greater size, particularly in the Northeast, and features racial and ethnic diversity. This is because these societal characteristics in these cities require a considerable amount of political management (Bridges & Kronick, 1999) .
The major impetus for reform in American municipal government was undoubtedly the Progressive Movement at the turn of the 20th century. The major support for the Progressives came from middle-and upper-middleclass citizens; some scholars even characterize the progressives as the reflection of "middle class ethos" (Banfield & Wilson, 1963) . The Progressives in both the Democratic and Republican parties advocated drastic changes in city government structure and employment practices as a means to end the influence of traditional "political machines" in city politics. In a classic essay on public administration penned in 1887, Woodrow Wilson set forth a manifesto for governmental reform that is still widely studied by public administration students throughout the country and regarded as a blueprint for good local government practice. In that well-known essay, Wilson wrote, "The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics" (p. 209). For Wilson and his fellow Progressives, city administration was more properly a matter of good business practices than a realm of political maneuvering and special treatment for the friends of those in power.
The Progressive Movement's strong support for cleaning up city politics stemmed from two basic premises. First, the Progressive Movement postulated a clear distinction between politics and administration. Efficiency in running municipal government is the central theme under this concept of a politics and administration dichotomy; the efficiency theme has been well documented in a number of major scholarly works in this area (Banfield & Wilson, 1963; Graham, 1967; Hofstadter, 1955) . Second, reformers advocated for at-large representation of the city as a whole rather than using election by ward for the selection of council members. Similarly, reformers changed municipal government structures to feature nonpartisan city managers as a method of reinforcing the politics-administration dichotomy (Lineberry & Fowler, 1967) .
In most situations, the Progressive Movement reformers called for three major changes in the structure of local government. First, efficient operation of a city was promoted by replacing the mayor-council type of government with a council-manager type of governance structure. Council-managers should be nonpartisan and appointed by elected officials (professionals). Second, nonpartisan elections should be used instead of partisan elections for one simple reason: Local elections should be about the needs of local residents and not about politics or political parties. Finally, reformers advocated the at-large election of council members to "reduce the impact of socio-economic cleavages and minority voting blocs in local politics" (Lineberry & Fowler, 1967, p. 701) .
In his historical analysis of municipal reform over the period 1900 to 1940 in 267 cities with 30,000 or more residents by the 1930 census, Knoke (1982) found, "During the four decades under study, 61% of the cities changed their form of administration at least once. Of those which changed once, 36% changed a second time" (p. 1324).
2 Undoubtedly, many local governments mandated major changes to their government structures (Banfield & Wilson, 1963; Clark, 1968) .
In terms of local government policies and practices, several studies have reported that cities with such traditional government structures tend to institute higher tax rates, spend more in public goods and services, and hire more city employees (Mehay & Gonzalez, 1994) than their municipal counterparts operating with "reformed" government structures (described in some detail below; Clark, 1968; Hanson, 1975; Karnig, 1975) . One of the most frequently cited studies of local government expenditure comparing cities with traditional local government structures and cities with reformed local government structures was conducted by Lineberry and Fowler (1967) . After controlling for demographic variables such as city size and region, they found that three features of traditional government structure, namely partisan elections, mayor-council governance, and election by ward, were positively associated with city tax rates in a set of 205 municipalities.
In addition, a rich body of literature can be found on the influence of the traditional style of government structure on local police departments in the second half of the 19th century. During this time, reformers witnessed the exercise of strong local political control over municipal police departments (Fogelson, 1977; Monkkonen, 1992) , the politicization of the organizational priorities of policing (Kelling & Moore, 1988; Reiss, 1992) , and frequent occurrences of documented police corruption (Fogelson, 1977; Lane, 1977; Rubinstein, 1973; Uchida, 1993; Walker, 1977) . These trends incited significant changes that were brought about by the efforts of the reformers during the Progressive Movement.
The publication of James Q. Wilson's classic book, Varieties of Police Behavior, delineated a direct linkage between local government structures and police behaviors. Different from the other historically oriented works discussed above, Wilson's study was the result of an empirical analysis conducted in early 1960s. Wilson's study provided strong evidence that local political culture, as reflected in governance structures, was still a powerful predictor of municipal police behavior (J. Q. Wilson, 1968) .
A review of the literature above regarding the local political culture approach draws attention to two important points. First, local government structures do appear to have a significant and direct impact on police organizations (e.g., J. Q. Wilson, 1968) . Second, empirical research demonstrates the assumption that there is a positive relationship between traditional government structures (mayor-council, at-large election, and partisan election) and police strength. The empirical research also indicates that such local government structures are often more responsive to myriad demands from local constituents and produce a higher level of taxes than reformed cities. Based on a cross-sectional sample of all U.S. cities with more than 25,000 in population using 1990 census data, Stucky (2005) found that local government structure has a positive effect on police employment after controlling for a number of relevant socioeconomic factors.
The Socioeconomic Approach
The socioeconomic approach focuses on crime levels and community socioeconomic characteristics as the primary determinants of local police strength. More specifically, four lines of reasoning can be merged into what is termed the socioeconomic approach: (a) rational choice, (b) economic conflict, (c) racial conflict, and (d) resource dependency. Zhao et al. / Predicting Police Strength 5 The rational choice explanation posits that citizens are rational and selfinterested actors. Public policy preferences are based on personal assessment of needs. Applying this line of reasoning to the relationship between local crime rates and residents' preferences for public policy responses, the rational choice explanation proposes that citizens act rationally in response to increase in crime rates by expressing a preference for appropriate municipal services such as greater police presence. For example, Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) found that decisions about the quantities of municipally provided goods and services were typically made collectively by the citizenry based on a relatively objective assessment of their external environment (Borcherding & Deacon, 1972; Nalla, 1992) . In such cases, citizens are aware of the crime rates existing in their communities; consequently, municipal police size should be proportional to the reported crime rate .
There have been several studies reporting support for the assumption, based on the rational choice explanation, that there is indeed a positive relationship between crime rates and police strength, including Lane's (1977) study of police employment in Boston during the second half of the 19th century and Richardson's (1970) study of the historical development of the New York Police Department. Similar historical evidence supporting the positive relationship between crime rates and police employment is found in other case and quantitative studies (e.g., Chapman, 1976; Jacobs, 1979; Jacobs & Helms, 1997; Nalla, 1992) .
The economic conflict explanation argues that legal and criminal justice system assets are not impartially administered for the general benefit of society. Instead, differences in economic status allow those who possess significant resources to subjugate those who are not in possession of such resources (see Chambliss, 1976; Chambliss & Seidman, 1982; Jacobs, 1979; Quinney, 1974) . The relationship between this inequitable economic stratification and the use of police resources begins with the idea that those who possess relatively abundant resources want to maintain their superior status. The best way to achieve that goal is through the creation of a strong police force that effectively controls the economically disadvantaged class (Jacobs, 1979; Turk, 1969) . In addition to possessing economic resources, those with wealth are able to translate their wealth into political influence (Chambliss & Seidman, 1982) . Thus, economic conflict theorists propose that increased formal control mechanisms, like robust police forces, are a result of the influence of the "haves" who attempt to advance their own interests. In other words, as economic resources become more unequally distributed, those who are economically privileged have a greater motivation, and the requisite political power, to maintain the status quo through the expansion of police forces (Chambliss & Seidman, 1982; Jacobs, 1979; Turk, 1969) . Researchers have commonly used the unemployment rate as a proxy measure of economic conflict; it is hypothesized that high-status individuals will view the unemployed as a threat to the existing social order and will lobby for a more robust police force (Jacobs, 1979; Kent & Jacobs, 2005) .
In a cross-sectional study of all standard metropolitan statistical areas with a population of greater than 250,000 in 1960 250,000 in and 1970 250,000 in , Jacobs (1979 found that economic inequality had a positive and significant effect in a majority of the statistical models measuring per capita police strength. Recently, in their panel analysis of 125 cities in the United States with populations of at least 100,000 residents during the period from 1980 to 2000, Kent and Jacobs (2005) found that the unemployment rate was a significant predictor of police strength (also see Jacobs, 1979) . They explained that these findings lend support to economic conflict explanations of crime control (for somewhat contradictory findings, please also see Chamlin, 1989 Chamlin, , 1990 Jacobs & Helms, 1997; Nalla, Lynch, & Leiber, 1997) . 3 The racial conflict explanation posits that municipal police strength is the direct result of the proportion of racial and ethnic minorities in a city's population (Turk, 1969 ). An increasingly visible minority population is perceived to be a crime problem by nonminority citizens (Blalock, 1967) . As this perceived criminal threat from racial and ethnic minority groups becomes more salient, the majority of the White population often makes successful political demands for additional police presence to quiet their fears (Jacobs, 1979; .
Empirical research has indicated a fairly consistent relationship between the size of the African American population and police strength in crosssectional studies of U.S. cities (see Chamlin, 1990; Greenberg, Kessler, & Loftin, 1985; Huff & Stahura, 1980; Jackson & Carroll, 1981; Jacobs, 1979; Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Sharp, 2006) . For example, traced the relationship between the size of the African American population and police strength to the civil rights movement. In their study of the determinants of police strength in 109 cities at 5-year intervals between 1950 and 1970, Liska et al. found that the percentage of non-White residents became an increasingly significant determinant of police strength in Southern cities beginning in 1957 and in the non-South in 1972. 4 They explained that civil rights activities began in the late 1950s in the South and did not reach the same level of intensity in the non-South Zhao et al. / Predicting Police Strength 7 until the middle to late 1960s. Furthermore, in their panel study of large U.S. cities for the period 1980 to 2000, Kent and Jacobs (2005) found a significant and positive relationship between racial composition, as measured by the natural log of the percentage of the Black population, and the strength of municipal police forces. In his review of 28 empirical studies, Sever (2003) found that a majority of these studies found either significant or mixed results, whereas only 5 studies found no relationship between size of minority population and police strength.
The resource dependency explanation postulates that the number of police officers in a city is likely dependent on the amount of available financial resources present within a municipal organization (Donaldson, 1995; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) . Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) introduced resource dependency theory as a way of examining how organizations change over time. This explanation remains popular in management science today (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) ; Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) reported that there were 2,321 citations of Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978) book as of 2002, with the majority of these occurring in the past 10 years (from 1992 to 2002). Applying the resource dependency explanation to the growth of police forces, it is argued that police strength is largely a result of the budgetary resources available to a particular municipal law enforcement agency.
Prior research has generally supported the resource dependency explanation. At the national level, Nalla's (1992) study on the growth of police bureaucracies between 1948 and 1984 found that police expenditures had a positive and significant effect on the previous year's municipal budget, supporting the idea that organizations create their own incremental inertia. Jacobs and Helms (1997) also found support for resource dependency theory at the national level. These scholars argued that changes in the per capita number of police personnel are related to the capacity of the economy to support law enforcement agents (p. 1381).
Research has also supported the resource dependency perspective at the city level (Chamlin, 1990; Nalla et al., 1997) . Greenberg et al. (1985) used city revenue (per capita) as a predictor of police growth in their panel analysis of police employees in 259 U.S. cities during the period from 1950 to 1980. The authors found that the city revenue per capita did not have a positive effect on police strength until the 1970 to 1980 panel. They proposed that city revenue per capita had an effect on police strength because the period from 1970 to 1980 was one of mounting national concern about crime (also see McDowall & Loftin, 1986) .
Method Data Sources
The data used in this analysis are derived from five distinct sources. The information on local government structure was collected in a series of surveys conducted by the Division of Governmental Studies and Services (DGSS) at Washington State University in 1993, 1996, 2000, and 2003 . DGSS has conducted mail surveys of city clerks from the same set of 280 cities in 47 states at roughly 3-year intervals since 1978. The cities in the sample were randomly selected from those municipalities initially included in a representative National Survey of Municipal Governments in cities of more than 25,000 in population conducted by the International City Management Association in 1969. In the most recent round of surveys (2003), 209 cities of the original sample (74.64%) provided complete information on local government structures. In 2000, 226 municipal governments (80.71%) completed surveys, whereas 233 (83.21%) answered the surveys in 1996. In 1993, survey responses from 234 city governments (83.57%) in the original sample were available for our final analysis. 5 The second source of data, information regarding violent crime rates and police employment, was collected from Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) published annually by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). UCR data reflect a nationwide effort to collect criminal activity data from approximately 17,000 state, county, and municipal law enforcement agencies voluntarily reporting crimes that have been brought to their attention. About 85% of law enforcement agencies report their annual crime data to the FBI. These data on "crimes known to police" contained in the UCR database for the years of 1991, 1994, 1998, and 2001 were downloaded from the Inner-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) Web site.
6 When collecting crime data from local police agencies, the FBI also asks for law enforcement employment information such as number of sworn employees authorized and actually on staff. In addition, the size of the civilian workforce in each police agency or sheriff's office is also part of the standard survey. The law enforcement employment data of the 4 years (1993, 1996, 2000, and 2003) were also downloaded through ICPSR Web site.
A third set of data was obtained through the Annual Finance Survey of City Government conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. The survey of local government finance officials asks questions concerning a wide variety of financial situations in a city government with respect to revenues, expenditures, debts incurred, and assets (cash, capital possessions, and security holdings). Zhao et al. / Predicting Police Strength 9 In this study, financial information of city revenue was gathered for each city in 1992, 1995, 1999, and 2002 (lagged by 1 year). The financial information was downloaded from the http://www.census.gov/govs/ Web site. The fourth type of data gathered is the annual unemployment rate data reported in 1993, 1996, 2000, and 2003 ; these data were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which regularly publishes unemployment and labor force participation information for U.S. cities with populations of 10,000 or more. Finally, standard demographic information on individuals and households at the city level was gathered from both the 1990 and 2000 U.S. census reports. The 1990 and 2000 data were directly derived from the DVD disks published by the U.S. Bureau of Census. Because the census data are available for every decade, the linear interpolation was used to compute the missing values of socioeconomic variables from 1993 to 2003 (Kovandzic, Sloan, & Vieraitis, 2002; Worrall & Kovandzic, 2007) .
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable for this study is police strength, measured as the total number of police employees (including sworn police officers and civilian personnel) per 1,000 local residents in the city population. This measure has been extensively used in the existing research on police strength (e.g., Chandler & Gely, 1995; Huff & Stahura, 1980; Sever, 2001; Stucky, 2005 ; for a review, see Sever, 2003) . There are two noteworthy distributional characteristics of this measure of police strength. First, there is noticeable variation among U.S. cities on this measure. For example, cities located along the Northeast coast tend to have higher police ratios per residents than their counterparts along the Western coastline. Second, there was a substantial increase in the number of police officers employed by police agencies across the nation during the 1990s; this increase in the police workforce outpaced the nation's population growth. In our data for 280 police departments, for example, the percentage increase in the police ratio per 1,000 residents was 5.2% between 1993 and 2003. The increase in the ratio of police employees to citizens and the presence of regional differences over time make this longitudinal study an important contribution to our understanding of police resource levels in American cities.
Independent Variables
Nine independent variables are included in this analysis. Four of those variables relate to aspects of the local political culture approach dealing with the local government governance structures, and the other five tap into the four explanations grouped into the rubric of the socioeconomic approach.
The reformers of the Progressive Movement focused on three areas of local government governance. Accordingly, our measures of local government structures feature three separate variables. Mayor-council is a categorical variable measuring city form of government, coded 1 for cities with mayor-council government and 0 for council-manager. The electoral procedure for council members is also a dichotomous variable. District is coded 1 if all council members are nominated and elected by ward and 0 if either all council members or some of them are elected at large. Partisan is coded 1 if the local and national party affiliations of candidates are identified on the ballot in city elections and 0 if the local election is nonpartisan. Finally, similar to Stucky (2005) , a traditional government structures (TGS) index is created to measure the extent of traditional grassroots government (range = 0-3).
In terms of the socioeconomic approach, five variables are used to measure the dynamics associated with the four explanations. First, the crime rate in a city is used to assess the influence of rational choice explanation phenomena. The crime rate represents the sum of the violent crime incidents (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) divided by the city's population and multiplied by 100,000.
We include the percentage of unemployment as a proxy for the economic conflict explanation. The unemployment rate is chosen as the measure of economic inequality in this study because it is plausible that the economic and political elite will view a growing population of individuals without work as a threat to the existing social structure. This same measure has been used for this type of analysis in previous studies (e.g., Kent & Jacobs, 2004 , 2005 . Similar to previous research, we use the percentage of African American and Latino populations to represent the dynamics associated with the theory of racial conflict (see Jacobs, 1979; Nalla et al., 1997) . The two variables are calculated at the city level by adding the number of African American and Latino residents and dividing by the total city population.
Finally, the annual city revenue per capita is employed as a measure reflecting the dynamics associated with the resource dependency explanation. 7 The reported annual city revenue "includes all amounts of money received by a government from external sources during its fiscal year" (Annual Finance Survey of City Government). To account for inflation, annual city revenue per capita has been adjusted for cost of living by the annual Consumer Price Index (CPI). The CPI, reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, is the most commonly used indicator of inflation.
Lagged effect is always a central issue in longitudinal research, primarily for the reason of simultaneity (e.g., Marvell & Moody, 1996; Sever, 2001) . Accordingly, the number of police employees, for example, in the 2000 survey is contingent on the amount of city revenue in year 1999. The annual city revenue measure is lagged by 1 year. In addition to the city revenue variable, all other independent and control variables are lagged by 1 year in the analysis, which is a common practice in panel data analysis (Marvell & Moody, 1996) , except for crime rates, with a 2-year lag. Similarly, three additional interaction variables are computed to examine the joint effect of traditional government index with the violent crime rate, the percentage of African American population, and the percentage of Latino population (Stucky, 2005) .
Control Variables
Three important control variables are used in this analysis. The city population and population density per square mile are used to control for city characteristics. For example, cities with higher population density may simply employ more police officers than their counterparts with low density. Similarly, the percentage of residents in the 15 to 24 age range is also included in the analysis to control for the proportion of the population that is most likely to require police attention.
Statistical Model
A pooled time-series panel data analysis technique is used to analyze the effects of the local political culture versus socioeconomic approaches to predicting police strength levels in U.S. cities. A panel data set is one that follows a given set of participants over time and provides multiple observations on each participant in the sample (Hsiao, 2003) . Panel data models have long been considered the preferred method for the study of causation. For example, Campbell and Stanley (1967) referred to panel models as "excellent quasi-experimental designs, perhaps the best of the more feasible designs" (pp. 55-57). Lempert (1966) observed that panel designs are research designs "par excellence" (pp. 130-131). Still other researchers have argued that panel techniques are essential to the causal analysis of correlation findings derived from cross-sectional studies (e.g., Hsiao, 2003; Stimson, 1985) .
More specifically, a two-factor fixed-effects panel data analysis approach is employed to evaluate the efficacy of static and dynamic approaches to the prediction of police strength levels.
8 It allows for unobserved systematic (nonrandom) variation to be controlled for in the longitudinal analysis. The "two-factor" approach accommodates a geographic component represented by the cities in which police departments reside and a time-specific temporal component represented by the four waves of data (2003, 2000, 1996, and 1993) for each of the cities. By investigating the "first factor" (the geographic component) through the inclusion of a cross-sectional dummy variable for each state in which the agencies reside, the difference in police strength (officer ratio) caused by unobserved variance occurring in each state is estimated.
9 This means that the bias caused by any omitted variables can then be estimated and an attempt can be made to control for extraneous effects in the panel data analyzed. Each state is allowed to have its own intercept but shares the slope coefficients with the other states (Marvell & Moody, 1995; Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1998) . Similarly, the "second factor" (the time-specific component) involves the systematic inclusion of year dummy variables that permit us to control for those unknown factors (omitted variables) affecting police strength in these cities that are not accounted for by the independent and socioeconomic variables. The two-factor fixedeffects model has the following symbolic form: represents a set of control variables (e.g., the city population, population density, and 15 to 24 age range population) and the β′ statistics are the associated coefficients. Finally, the symbol ε it represents the error term. It should be noted that a robust error estimate method is used in the analysis. In comparison to standard error estimates, this method addresses the issue of heteroskedastic errors across the units and also for the correlated errors within units over different periods (Cao, Stromsdorfer, & Weeks, 1996, p. 215 ). All t tests and F tests reported in the following analyses are based on the corrected variance and covariance estimates.
The total number of variables on the right side of the equation in the analysis includes the 9 independent variables plus 3 interaction variables representing the political culture and socioeconomic approaches to police strength. In addition, 3 time-varying control variables, 4 year dummy variables needed to control for variation over time, and 43 state dummies needed to control for geographically based unobserved systematic variation in the panel model are also included in the analytical model. All statistical diagnoses, analyses, and estimations were carried out in STATA.
Findings
The descriptive statistics displayed in Table 1 Table 1 sets forth the dependent variable, police employee ratio per 1,000 residents. The means of police employee to citizen ratios show that there was a steady increase in police employees from 1993 onward. The peak was at 2000 (2.69 per 1,000 residents). This pattern may reflect the amount of funding distributed by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services after the passage of the Crime Control Act in 1994, which provided $9 billion to subsidize the hiring of 100,000 additional police officers and to update police agency technology and equipment.
Comparing across the three measurements of local government structures in each wave of the survey, there was a very limited change in the structural arrangements in these cities surveyed. 10 The first variable, mayor-council, indicates that between 41% (1993) to 48% (2003) fell into the category of mayor-council government structure in the longitudinal data.
11 Similarly, the district council variable shows that about 30% of cities in the sample had ward local elections. In addition, the presence of partisan identification in municipal elections accounted for 15% in 1993 returns and 13% in the remaining three waves (2003, 2000, and 1996) . Overall, the means of the three variables measuring local government structure are quite stable over time in our sample, although some agencies did not participate in all four waves of surveys. The TGS index is the sum of all three variables added together to measure the extent of traditional government with a variation from 0 to 3. The next five independent variables represent the socioeconomic approach. Similar to national crime patterns, cities in our sample showed a 31.6% drop in the mean violent crime rate from 1,036.2 incidents in 1993 per 100,000 population to 708.5 incidents in 2003. The unemployment rate also mirrored the national trend, beginning with 7.19% unemployment rate in 1993 when the U.S. economy was in a recession. The lowest mean unemployment rate was recorded in 2000 (4.21%), before the "tech bubble" burst.
In terms of minority population present in the panel data, the means reported in Table 1 There was a steady increase in population in these 280 cities from 195,000 in 1993 to 215,000 in 2003. Similarly, there was a noticeable rise of population density in the survey. Finally, it is interesting to note that the percentage of population between 15 and 24 dropped from 16.07% in 1993 to 15.59% in 2003. In sum, the descriptive statistics displayed in Table 1 clearly suggest that cities in the current panel sample generally reflect the socioeconomic changes that took place at the turn of the 21st century.
In the multivariate analysis, we ran four separate equations. The first equation serves as the baseline, with only the socioeconomic approach variables and control variables included. The political culture variables measuring local government structures are added in the second and third equations. The final equation includes the previous set of variables and the interaction terms. The robustly estimated standard errors are reported in Appendix A.
In Equation 1 , all of the variables representing the four explanations composing the socioeconomic approach are shown to be statistically significant. Three are positively associated with police strength: violent crime rate, percentage of population that is Black, and total city revenue per capita. Based on the estimates in the equation, if the percentage of African American population doubles, there will be 1.5 additional police employees per 1,000 residents in the city. Similarly, a $30,000 increase in the city revenue per resident will produce 1 additional police employee per 1,000 residents in the city. If violent crime incidents increase 141% (1,000 incidents per 100,000 population, 708.47 incidents per 100,000 population in 2003), police strength increases by 12.2% (.3236 per 1,000, 2.65 mean of officer ratio in 2003).
It is interesting that the percentage of Latino population is negatively associated with police strength, indicating that cities with large increases in Latino population may hire fewer officers. Also, somewhat unexpected, the unemployment rate is shown to be a negative predictor of police strength. The two control variables, city population and population density, also manifest a statistically significant impact. The larger the city size and the more densely populated the area, the more officers a city needs to maintain peace and order. In addition, compared to the reference year of 1993, the year dummy variables of 2000 and 2003 are each significant predictors, suggesting that police strength significantly increased during this period. In addition, the increase in police strength remained even after taking variables such as city revenues and other socioeconomic factors into consideration. The adjusted R 2 for Equation 1 is .70. It is worthwhile to note that of the 70% of variance explained, 20% is explained by the 43 state dummy variables (which are not listed in Table 2 ). This finding indicates that state differences in police strength do exist in our sample, and those differences made a significant contribution to the overall model.
The addition of three variables representing local government structure is reported in Equation 2. The results reported in that equation clearly indicate that none of the three variables, mayor-council, district council, and partisan election, had an appreciable impact on police strength during this period. Furthermore, the TGS index was added to replace the three local government structure variables to assess the potential additive effect on police strength shown in Equation 3. Once again, the TGS index failed to achieve statistical significance. Finally, the three interaction variables with the TGS index were included in the analysis. Only one (TGS index × percentage of Latino) out of the three interaction variables is statistically significant.
The adjusted R 2 values for the four equations show that the inclusion of the four variables representing local government structure and the three interaction variables did not elevate the R 2 from Equation 2 to Equation 4. In the meantime, the F values dropped in magnitude after the computation of Equation 1, indicating that local government structure and the interaction variables do not significantly contribute to police strength levels. It is noteworthy that the R 2 explained by the 43 state dummy variables is consistent across the four equations, coming in at about 20%. In addition, if the variables reflecting the socioeconomic approach or other factors such as city population and time in Equation 1 are significant, they are equally significant for the remaining three equations (Equations 2 to 4; see Appendix A for robust standard errors). Finally, we also ran the four models with standardized coefficients to examine the relative contributions of these various predictive variables. The standardized coefficients reveal that percentage African American population is the most significant predictor, followed by the violent crime rate, population density, city population, and two of the year dummy variables (see Appendix B).
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to determine the efficacy of the local political culture and socioeconomic approaches in explaining police strength levels in American cities. The socioeconomic approach has predominated in the relevant literature on police strength levels in the United States since the 1970s (Sever, 2003) . The renewed interest in the role of local government structures has opened another potential avenue of insight into the dynamics of municipal police force level decision making. Employing a panel data set featuring 280 police departments studied at the turn of the 21st century when a significant increase in police force strength was documented in the United States, we took a closer look at this important research issue. Our primary findings suggest that the local political culture approach, featuring the key role of local government structures, failed to account for the cross-city variation in police strength during this period. We did find considerable support for the conventional socioeconomic approach. At this point, we would like to offer two principal observations derived from the current study.
First, we provide a tentative explanation regarding the diminishing influence of local political culture, focusing on J. Q. Wilson's (1968) research on local political culture conducted in the 1960s. Unquestionably, Wilson was the first scholar who pioneered studying the relationship between local political culture and police organizational behaviors. Drawing from the rich body of research in political science, Wilson argued that distinctive local government structures largely determine the particular style of policing present in a city. For example, cities with a council-manager type of government featuring nonpartisan election (good government) tend to have police departments that emphasize strict law enforcement activities (e.g., DWI arrests). In contrast, police agencies located in cities with the mayor-council type of government tend to focus on order maintenance activities. In his case study of eight cities and the retest of his theory using a national sample, Wilson found full support for his theory that local political culture had a significant influence on police organizational behavior (also see Cohn, Farrington, & Wright, 1998; J. Q. Wilson & Boland, 1978; Wright & Miller, 1998) . Zhao et al. / Predicting Police Strength 19 Since the publication of Varieties of Police Behavior, several accomplished scholars have attempted to replicate Wilson's findings with more contemporary data (e.g., Langworthy, 1985) . Langworthy (1985) found that "the expectation that arrest rates for larceny and driving while intoxicated would be higher in good government cities than in traditional cities is supported" (p. 97; also see Crank, 1990) . Similarly, Pursley (1976) found that the number of police departments with "reform" police chiefs was significantly higher in the council-manager type of governments than in mayor-council governments.
More recently, using data derived from a 1998 survey of large, municipal police agencies, Zhao and Hassell (2005) retested the relationship between Wilson's measures of local political culture and police organizational priorities. In the analysis, the researchers found no support for Wilson's argument that local government structures determine the character of policing activities (also see Hassell et al., 2003) . The review of research on Wilson's theory of local political culture and relevant studies indicates that the impact of local government structures on police organizations has been diminishing since the 1960s, showing partial support in the 1980s (Crank, 1990; Langworthy, 1985) and no support in the late 1990s (Hassell et al., 2003; Zhao & Hassell, 2005) . We believe that the diminishing effect of local government structures on police organizations may be the result of a variety of factors, including the progressive standardization of police organizational behavior by the issuance of state mandates (e.g., recruit requirements, hours of training, etc.), the actions of the courts to protect civil liberties and promote social equity (e.g., Miranda notification and affirmative action programs), and the efforts of the federal government to promote community policing during the 1990s through a massive infusion of federal funds into state and local law enforcement.
Our second observation concerns the test of the four explanations that encompass the socioeconomic approach. Though all five variables derived from the four explanations produced statistically significant effects, the direction of two effects were inconsistent with our predictions. Our results showed that the rational choice explanation was supported because the violent crime rate was a significant predictor of police strength levels across cities. Similarly, city revenue per capita was significant, providing support for the resource dependency explanation. Finally, our findings revealed that the percentage of population that was African American was a highly significant predictor of police strength; it is clear that racial conflict theory contributed most strongly to the statistical model used to account for variation in police strength levels across U.S. cities. This finding is quite consistent with the existing literature on the continuing salience of racial inequity theories in U.S. society (Benson, Joong, Rasmussen, & Zuehlke, 1992; Chamlin, 1989; Huff & Stahura, 1980; Sever, 2001) .
It is noteworthy that the percentage of the Latino population was negatively associated with police strength in our set of cities. Using a cross-sectional sample of all 1,083 U.S. cities with a 1990 population of more than 25,000, two recent studies found that there was a significant and positive association between the percentage of Latino population and police strength after controlling for other political, economic, and demographic factors (Sever, 2001; Stucky, 2005) . Although the Sever (2001) and Stucky (2005) studies produced important findings that need to be considered, the literature on the relationship between the size of Latino communities and police strength remains mixed. On one hand, it is true that Latinos are often depicted as dangerous classes in the mass media because of the presence of youth gangs and drug trafficking among Latinos and the fact that many illegal immigrants are Latinos (Martinez, 2000) . On the other hand, it is also the case that Latinos as an ethnic group display strong family values, a strong work ethic, and a growing sense of group identity and desire for becoming an integral part of American pluralistic society in an age of globalization. It has been noted in some studies that social control remains pervasive in Latino neighborhoods, and, as a consequence, Latinos are less likely to call for police assistance than are their Anglo counterparts (Herbst, 2002) . Given that Latinos became the largest ethnic minority group in the United States as of the 2000 census, more research is clearly needed in the area concerning Latino population and police strength in American cities.
The primary question addressed in this study is "Why are there more police officers in some cities than others?" It is hoped that the application of the two-way fixed-effects panel data analysis adds to our collective understanding of variable police strength levels across U.S. municipal police forces. The findings related to the declining salience of local political culture, the importance of racial inequity, the impact of violent crime, and the effects of a growing Latino population are all noteworthy. Some findings reported here may be considered controversial; we invite other scholars to investigate this important research topic. In addition, we call for additional research on the finding of a negative relationship between police employment and municipal unemployment in these 280 cities during the 1990s. 
Robust Standard Errors

Notes
if cities reported inconsistent local government structures, the follow-up calls were to verify that an actual change in government structure had taken place. 6. The measurements of violent crime rates are lagged by 2 years, as is the common practice in the analysis of panel data to solve the simultaneous problem between crime rates and police strength. See Marvell and Moody (1996) and Stucky (2005) for more discussion.
7. Annual city revenue, rather than police expenditure, is used as a measure of resource dependency explanation because of the high correlation between police expenditures and the number of police officers. Research almost always uses either police expenditures or the number of police to measure police levels. See Greenberg, Kessler, and Loftin (1983) for more discussion.
8. The Hausman specification tests were examined systematically. The results indicated that coefficients associated with fixed-effects and random-effects models were significantly different from one another. Moreover, the results were weighted in favor of the fixed-effects model.
9. We decided to use state dummy variables in the model for two primary reasons. First, the literature on police strength suggests that there is a significant regional effect on police strength (e.g., Stucky, 2005) . Here, the geographic region is defined either as four regions (e.g., Northeast, West, etc.) or as nine regions. The use of state dummy variables has as its advantage controlling for additional unobserved variance at the state level. Second, our data feature four waves. If city dummies are employed in the analysis, the degrees of freedom become a major concern.
10. We did observe some limited changes in the local government structures over time in our sample. For example, regarding council member election, Mesa (AZ) changed its form from at large to by ward in 2000. Overland Park (KS) changed the form of council member election from partisan to nonpartisan in 2000.
11. The percentage of each wave differed because of variation in responses of cities at each wave. In the analysis, we used the unbalanced sample method to address this issue.
12. The means of three measures of local government structure, to a large extent, reflect the available information on the characteristics of cities posted on the National League of Cities Web site (www.nlc.org). For example, overall, 34.2% of U.S. cities elect council members at the district level (the larger the city is, the more likely it is to have at-district election). In Table 1 , the grand mean of district election was 30.0%. A recent survey conducted by the National League of Cities also revealed that about 38.0% of cities have a mayor-council type of government. In our sample, the grand mean was 43.75%. The only information available on partisan election on this Web site showed that 30.0% of the 30 largest U.S. cities have partisan elections at local level. Because smaller cities are more likely to have nonpartisan elections, the overall mean in our sample was 13.5%.
